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DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
Gary Shaw
*
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The al-Qaeda attack on the United States on September 11, 
2001, resulted in Congress passing a joint resolution, the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force (―AUMF‖),1 which authorizes the Pres-
ident to ―use all necessary and appropriate force against those na-
tions, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such organi-
zations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or 
persons.‖2 
Pursuant to the AUMF, President Bush committed armed 
forces to Afghanistan in order to subdue al-Qaeda and the Taliban re-
gime that supported al-Qaeda.3  President Bush claimed that the 
AUMF granted him the authority to hold an ―enemy combatant‖ who 
was captured, ―without formal charges or proceedings,‖ until a de-
termination has been made ―that access to counsel or further process 
is warranted.‖4  This position gave rise to several cases in which the 
Supreme Court had to grapple with the issue of what process was due 
to captured enemy combatants.5  Could they be held indefinitely 
 
*
 Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  Thank you to 
my colleagues who read prior drafts and made valuable suggestions. 
1
Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2006). 
2
Id. 
3
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
4
Id. at 510-11. 
5
See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
1
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without charges or proceedings being initiated?  If proceedings had to 
be initiated, what process was due to the defendants?  In determining 
the answers to these questions, the Supreme Court distinguished be-
tween two different categories—United States citizens who were 
deemed enemy combatants and non-citizens who were deemed ene-
my combatants.6 
The recurring theme that arises in reading the Court‘s deci-
sions resolving these issues is the power struggle between the Execu-
tive and Judicial branches of the United States Government as to 
which branch possesses the power to determine due process for ene-
my combatants.7  Initially, the Executive claimed that it possessed the 
power to solely decide who was an enemy combatant as well as what 
process, if any, was due to the persons it determined were enemy 
combatants.8  Ultimately, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to 
decide the first question.9  Moreover, the Court also rejected the latter 
position, determining that the Judiciary, not the Executive, was the 
arbiter of what process was due an enemy combatant.10 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
A.  Process Due to a United States Citizen Deemed an 
Enemy Combatant 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11 the Supreme Court dealt with the is-
sue of what process is due to a United States citizen deemed to be an 
enemy combatant by the government.12  Yaser Hamdi was a United 
 
548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507. 
6
Compare Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516, with Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 
(2004), Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 558, and Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 (comparing 
the difference between U.S. citizens and non-citizens being deemed enemy comba-
tants). 
7
See generally Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723; Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557; Hamdi, 542 
U.S. 507; Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. 
8
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527-28 (arguing that courts have ―limited institutional 
capabilities . . . in matters of military decision-making‖). 
9
Id. at 516-17. 
10
Id. at 535-37. 
11
542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
12
Id. at 509. 
2
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States citizen living in Afghanistan in 2001.13  ―[H]e was seized by 
members of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups op-
posed to the Taliban government, and eventually was turned over to 
the United States military.‖14  Subsequently, he was transferred to a 
naval brig in the United States and held there.15  The Government 
claimed that Hamdi had been fighting on behalf of the Taliban and 
was thus an enemy combatant who could be held as described 
above.16 
Hamdi‘s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a 
next friend in the Eastern District of Virginia, arguing that Hamdi‘s 
indefinite detention without charges, access to an impartial tribunal, 
or assistance of counsel violated Hamdi‘s right to due process.17  
―The District Court found that Hamdi‘s father was a proper next 
friend, appointed the federal public defender as counsel for the peti-
tioners, and ordered that counsel be given access to Hamdi.‖18  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 
claiming that the district court had failed to properly consider the 
―Government‘s security and intelligence interests.‖19  It remanded the 
case, instructing the district court ―to conduct a deferential inquiry in-
to Hamdi‘s status.‖20 
On remand, the Government moved to dismiss the petition.21  
Its sole evidence that Hamdi was an enemy combatant consisted of a 
declaration from Michael Mobbs, who was identified as a Special 
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy regarding de-
tention of enemy combatants.22  ―The [Mobbs] declaration state[d] 
that Hamdi ‗traveled to Afghanistan‘ in July or August of 2001 . . . 
‗affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received weapons train-
ing,‘ ‖23 and that when the Taliban engaged in battle with the North-
ern Alliance, Hamdi‘s military unit surrendered and Hamdi turned 
 
13
Id. at 510. 
14
Id. 
15
Id. 
16
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510-11. 
17
Id. at 511. 
18
Id. at 512. 
19
Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)).  
20
Id. 
21
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512.
 
22
Id. 
23
Id. at 512-13 (quoting Joint Appendix at 148, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-
6696), 2004 WL 1120871).  
3
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over his weapon to the Northern Alliance.24  The Mobbs declaration 
further asserted ―that Hamdi was labeled an enemy combatant 
‗[b]ased upon his interviews and in light of his association with the 
Taliban.‘ ‖25  The declaration stated that ―a series of ‗U. S. military 
screening team[s]‘ determined that Hamdi met the ‗criteria for enemy 
combatants,‘ and ‗[a] subsequent interview . . . confirmed the fact 
that he surrendered‘ ‖ to the Northern Alliance and gave them his 
weapon.26  The district court thus held ―that the Mobbs declaration 
fell ‗far short‘ of supporting Hamdi‘s detention.‖27  The Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the declaration, ―if accurate,‖ was suffi-
cient to support the Executive‘s decision to detain Hamdi.28 
There were two issues before the Supreme Court in Hamdi.  
The initial issue was whether the Executive had plenary power to de-
tain enemy combatants.29  The second issue was what process, if any, 
was due to persons who were detained as enemy combatants.30  The 
Supreme Court was badly splintered on how to resolve these two is-
sues.  Justice O‘Connor issued a plurality opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, in which she an-
nounced the judgment of the Court; Justice Souter, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, concurred in part and dissented in part; Justice Scalia, 
joined by Justice Stevens, dissented; and Justice Thomas dissented.31 
The Court ultimately concluded that it did not have to decide 
the first issue, finding that Congress had authorized the Executive to 
detain enemy combatants.32  Five Justices (O‘Connor, the justices 
joining her plurality opinion, and Justice Thomas) concluded that the 
AUMF authorized the detention.33  The plurality made clear, howev-
 
24
Id. at 513. 
25
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 149).  
26
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513 (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 23, at 149-50). 
27
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 292, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 
WL 1123351, at *292).  
28
Id. at 514 (quoting Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2004)).  
29
Id. at 516. 
30
Id. at 524. 
31
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 508, 539, 554, 579. 
32
Id. at 516-18. 
33
See id. at 519 (concluding that although the AUMF did not explicitly speak of 
detention, detention was necessary to prevent an enemy combatant from returning 
to battle).  Thus, because the AUMF permitted ―the use of ‗necessary and 
appropriate force,‘ ‖ the plurality concluded that this authorized detention under the 
circumstances in Hamdi‘s case.  Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 27, at 
4
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er, that detention was only authorized when it was ―sufficiently clear 
that the individual is, in fact, an enemy combatant.‖34  This reasoning 
required that a determination be made as to whether there was suffi-
cient evidence that an individual is an enemy combatant, which nec-
essarily raised the issue of what process is due to an individual in the 
determination as to whether he was an enemy combatant.35 
In resolving what process was due, two sub-issues needed to 
be settled.  The first was which branch was to decide the process due 
to the detained individuals.36  The second was what process was in 
fact due in determining whether an individual was being properly de-
tained.37  Regarding the issue of who decided what process was due, 
the Executive‘s position was that under the doctrines of separation of 
powers and political question—in this case, the Supreme Court‘s lack 
of qualifications in ―matters of military decision-making‖—the Judi-
ciary was limited only to determining whether authorization existed 
―for the broader detention scheme‖ and had no authority to determine 
the propriety of individual detentions.38  Alternatively, the Executive 
argued that the Court ―should review . . . [the Executive‘s] determina-
tion that a . . . [person] is an enemy combatant under a very deferen-
tial . . . standard.‖39  A majority of the Court (Justice O‘Connor, the 
justices joining her plurality opinion, and Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Stevens in his dissent) rejected both of these positions, ruling 
 
284).  Justice Thomas, in his dissent, accepted the essence of this analysis.  Id. at 
587 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
34
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 523 (plurality opinion). 
To be clear, our opinion only finds legislative authority to detain 
under the AUMF once it is sufficiently clear that the individual 
is, in fact, an enemy combatant; whether that is established by 
concession or by some other process that verifies this fact with 
sufficient certainty seems beside the point. 
Id.  Although Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that the Government ―has 
power to detain those that the Executive branch determines to be enemy 
combatants,‖ he disagreed with the plurality about the Judiciary‘s authority to 
determine whether or not the defendant was ―actually an enemy combatant.‖  Id. at 
585-86, 589 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas believed that the Judiciary 
lacked the expertise and capacity to ―second-guess‖ a determination by the 
Executive that the defendant was an enemy combatant.  Id. at 585, 589. 
35
Id. at 524 (plurality opinion). 
36
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525-26. 
37
Id. at 524. 
38
Id. at 527. 
39
Id. 
5
Shaw: American Military Tribunals
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
34 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
that it is the Judiciary that makes these determinations.40 
However, the Court did not agree on how the determination as 
to what process is due should be made.41  The plurality stated that the 
determination should be made by adopting the balancing test from 
Mathews v. Eldridge.42  In Mathews, the Supreme Court balanced 
three factors in deciding what process is due in a given circums-
tance.43  The first factor to be considered is the ―private interest that 
will be affected by the [governmental] action.‖44  In Hamdi, it is the 
detainee‘s liberty, a very important interest.45  The second factor is 
the government‘s interest and the burden that would be placed on the 
government in providing greater process.46  The plurality noted the 
weight of the Government‘s interest in preventing enemy combatants 
from returning to do battle against the United States, but stated this 
did not outweigh the individual‘s liberty interest to such an extent 
that it allowed for unchallenged detention.47  The third factor is ―the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation‖ of the defendant‘s liberty interest 
and what the probable value of additional or substitute safeguards 
would be.48  The plurality stated that when the interests of the indi-
vidual and government were balanced against each other, ―the risk of 
 
40 Justice O‘Connor‘s plurality decision explicitly rejected the Executive‘s 
argument that separation of powers circumscribed the Judiciary‘s role in assessing 
the process due an individual in Hamdi‘s circumstances.  Id. at 535-36.  Focusing 
on the respective roles of the branches, O‘Connor stated that ―unless Congress acts 
to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a 
necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an 
important judicial check on the Executive‘s discretion in the realm of detentions.‖  
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.  Justice Scalia, in his dissent, concluded that the Executive 
did not have the sole power to determine the propriety of detention, stating that 
Hamdi should be released unless criminal charges were brought against him (which 
would involve the judiciary) or ―Congress ha[d] suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus.‖  Id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Scalia concluded that Congress had not 
done so simply by passing the AUMF and thus, the Executive did not have the 
authority to detain Hamdi.  Id. at 573-75. 
41
Compare id. at 528-29 (plurality opinion), with id. at 583 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (discussing due process and concerns of national security). 
42
424 U.S. 319 (1976); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 (plurality opinion) (citing 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
43
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
44
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
45
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
46
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
47
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32. 
48
Id. at 529 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
6
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an erroneous deprivation . . . [was] unacceptably high,‖ unless the cit-
izen-detainee was entitled to ―notice of the factual basis for his classi-
fication and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government‘s factual as-
sertions before a neutral decision maker.‖49  Although not adopting 
the plurality‘s reasoning that Mathews applied, Justice Souter, joined 
by Justice Ginsburg, concurred that detainees were entitled to this 
process, creating a majority on these points.50 
The plurality then went on to state that it might be appropriate 
to admit hearsay evidence ―as the most reliable available evidence‖ at 
the hearings.51  No other justices adopted this position, although none 
explicitly rejected it.  The plurality further stated that it might be 
permissible for there to be ―a presumption in favor of the Govern-
ment‘s evidence, so long as‖ there was a fair opportunity for the de-
tainee to rebut the presumption.52  Justice Souter, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, explicitly rejected this standard and no other justices 
agreed to it.53 
Therefore, the only process which a majority of the Court 
agreed was necessary was (a) notice of the factual basis for his classi-
fication, and (b) a fair opportunity to rebut the Government‘s factual 
assertions before a neutral decision maker.54  Justices Scalia, Stevens, 
and Thomas failed to address any of the specifics regarding process 
discussed above.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, concluded 
that enemy combatants should be tried in the criminal court system.55  
Scalia argued that unless Congress suspends the writ of habeas cor-
pus, the criminal justice system is the only available method for inca-
pacitating and punishing those accused of treason56 and concluded 
that the AUMF did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.57  Conse-
quently, he did not address the specifics as to what process would be 
due in military tribunals.  Justice Thomas concluded that it was not 
appropriate for the Judiciary to consider the issues presented in Ham-
 
49
Id. at 532-33 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
50
Id. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in 
the judgment). 
51
Id. at 533-34 (plurality opinion). 
52
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534. 
53
Id. at 553-54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in the judgment). 
54
Id.  
55
Id. at 564, 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
56
Id.  
57
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573-75. 
7
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di, concluding that the Court was precluded from adjudicating by the 
doctrine of political question.58  Therefore, he also did not address the 
specific aspects of due process in military tribunals. 
B.  Process Due to Non-Citizen Aliens Deemed Enemy 
Combatants 
The battle to determine the extent of Executive power vis-à-
vis Congress as well as the Supreme Court‘s power to determine 
what process is due continued through three more cases, Rasul v. 
Bush,59 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,60 and Boumediene v. Bush.61  These 
three cases differ from Hamdi in that Hamdi deals with a United 
States citizen being held in the United States whereas, Rasul, Ham-
dan, and Boumediene deal with non-United States citizens being held 
at the United States Naval Station in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.62 
In Rasul, the Court specifically dealt with the preliminary is-
sue of whether or not United States courts had ―jurisdiction to con-
sider challenges to the‖ detention of non-United States citizens cap-
tured in connection with hostilities outside the United States who 
were then incarcerated at Guantánamo.63  In a 6-3 decision, the Su-
preme Court held that pursuant to Section 2241 of the federal habeas 
statute, federal courts have jurisdiction over extraterritorial habeas 
petitioners in Guantánamo.64  This ruling opened the door to the issue 
of what process is due to such detainees.  In Hamdan and Boume-
diene, the Supreme Court dealt with the process due to non-US citi-
zens being detained as enemy combatants.65 
In Hamdan, the Court dealt with the issue of whether military 
tribunals created by an Executive Order of President Bush provided 
 
58
Id. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
59
542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
60
548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
61
553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
62
Compare Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (stating that Hamdi was a 
citizen of the United States), with Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71 (stating that petitioners 
were Australian and Kuwaiti citizens), Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566 (stating petitioner 
was a Yemeni national), and Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 (stating petitioners were 
aliens). 
63
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470. 
64
Id. at 484-85. 
65
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732. 
8
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adequate process to the alien defendant.66  In Afghanistan in 2001, 
militia forces captured petitioner Hamdan, a Yemeni national, and 
turned him over to the United States military.67  In 2002, he was 
transported to prison in Guantánamo.68  ―Over a year later, the Presi-
dent deemed [Hamdan] eligible for trial by military commission for 
then-unspecified crimes.‖69 
In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the system of 
military tribunals was illegal in that the procedures utilized therein 
contravened the Uniform Code of Military Justice (―UCMJ‖) as well 
as the Geneva Conventions.70  Although the Government argued that 
the President had executive authority to convene such military com-
missions, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that 
there was no need to decide this issue because Congress had autho-
rized military commissions in Article 21 of the UCMJ and neither the 
AUMF nor the Detainee Treatment Act (―DTA‖)71 had authorized the 
President to expand or alter the provisions set forth in the UCMJ.72 
Article 36 of the UCMJ requires that ―[a]ll rules and regula-
tions made under the [UCMJ] shall be uniform insofar as practica-
ble . . . .‖73  The Court determined that the procedures set forth in the 
Executive Order were significantly inconsistent with the UCMJ.74  
Although the procedures required that the accused be presented with 
a copy of the charges against him, be presumed innocent, and receive 
―certain other rights typically afforded criminal defendants in civilian 
courts and courts-martial,‖ the Court stated that these protections 
were undercut by other provisions.75  These provisions included the 
fact that the presiding officer could exclude the defendant and his ci-
vilian counsel from certain portions of the proceedings, did not per-
 
66
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566-67; see also Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 
(Nov. 13, 2001). 
67
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566. 
68
Id. 
69
Id. 
70
Id. at 564, 567 (indicating Chief Justice Roberts did not participate). 
71
See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, H.R. 2863, 109th
 
Cong. § 1001 (2005) 
(providing no authorization for the Executive branch regarding the provisions set 
forth in the UCMJ).  
72
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594-95. 
73
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006). 
74
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624. 
75
Id. at 613-14. 
9
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mit the defendant to examine all the evidence against him, permitted 
the introduction of both hearsay evidence and evidence obtained from 
coercion, and did not require that live testimony nor written state-
ments be sworn.76  The Court also noted that both the accused and his 
counsel might be denied access to relevant evidence deemed to be 
―protected information.‖77  Concluding that these provisions signifi-
cantly deviated from the procedures set forth in the UCMJ and that 
the Executive had failed to show adequate justification for these vari-
ations, the Court held that Hamdan‘s military commission was illeg-
al.78 
The Supreme Court‘s decisions in Hamdi and Hamdan trig-
gered responses from the other branches of government.  In 2004, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense (in response to the Court‘s decision in 
Hamdi) established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (―CSRTs‖) 
with jurisdiction to determine whether individuals detained at Guan-
tánamo were enemy combatants.79  The order set forth the procedures 
governing the hearings.80  Congress also passed the Detainee Treat-
ment Act, which set forth standards for review of the decisions from 
CSRTs.81  In response to Hamdan, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act (―MCA‖)82 in 2006, which stripped federal courts 
 
76
Id. at 614. 
77
Id. at 613-14.  The Court further elaborated: 
―[P]rotected information‖ . . . includes classified information as 
well as ―information protected by law or rule from unauthorized 
disclosure‖ and ―information concerning other national security 
interests,‖ . . . so long as the presiding officer concludes that the 
evidence is ―probative‖ . . . and that its admission without the ac-
cused‘s knowledge would not ―result in the denial of a full and 
fair trial.‖ 
Id. at 614 (quoting U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1, §§ 
6(D)(5)(a)–(b) (Aug. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/MCO%20No.%201%20(Aug%2031,%202005).pdf).  
78
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624-25.  The Court went on to find that the military 
commissions also violate the Geneva Conventions, although there was no majority 
opinion as to the manner by which the Geneva Conventions were violated.  Id. at 
625-26. 
79
Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed 
Answers to the Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667, 670 n.15 (2006); see also 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733-34. 
80
Blocher, supra note 79, at 671, 674. 
81
Id. 
82
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006). 
10
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of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions pending at the time of 
its enactment.83  In Boumediene, the Court held that because the DTA 
did not provide adequate review of CSRT decisions, the MCA was 
unconstitutional.84 
In Boumediene, foreign nationals were detained at Guantána-
mo as enemy combatants.85  They denied being enemy combatants.86  
They claimed the privilege of habeas corpus, alleging that the MCA 
could not constitutionally deprive courts of jurisdiction to hear ha-
beas corpus petitions.87 
The Court started by noting that the writ of habeas corpus ap-
plied to Guantánamo88 and that Congress had not suspended the 
writ.89  The Court then stated that absent such a suspension, Congress 
could only preclude habeas review if the DTA functioned as an effec-
tive substitute for habeas review.90  The Court then concluded that the 
DTA did not so function.91 
The Court started by looking at the constraints on the defen-
dant‘s ability to rebut the government‘s assertion that he is an enemy 
combatant and noted the following deficiencies: 
[The detainee] does not have the assistance of counsel 
and may not be aware of the most critical allegations 
that the Government relied upon to order his deten-
tion.  The detainee can confront witnesses that testify 
during the CSRT proceedings.  But given that there 
are in effect no limits on the admission of hearsay evi-
dence—the only requirement is that the tribunal deem 
the evidence ―relevant and helpful,‖ the detainee‘s op-
portunity to question witnesses is likely to be more 
theoretical than real.92 
The Court then concluded that even if all parties acted in good faith, 
and with diligence, there was still ―considerable risk of error in the 
 
83
Id. 
84
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732-33. 
85
Id. at 732. 
86
Id. at 734. 
87
Id. 
88
Id. at 771. 
89
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
90
Id. at 792. 
91
Id. 
92
Id. at 783-84 (citations omitted). 
11
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tribunal‘s findings of fact‖93 and stated that a functional equivalent of 
habeas corpus would need to provide the reviewing court the ability 
to correct such errors.94 
The Court recognized that under the DTA the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals had ―the power to review CSRT determina-
tions by assessing the legality of standards and procedures‖ and that 
this implied the power of the Court of Appeals ―to inquire into what 
happened at the CSRT hearing and, perhaps, remedy certain deficien-
cies in that proceeding.‖95  But the Court noted that this was the ex-
tent of the Court of Appeals‘ jurisdiction and that there was: 
[N]o language in the DTA that can be construed to al-
low the Court of Appeals to admit and consider newly 
discovered evidence that could not have been made 
part of the CSRT record because it was unavailable to 
either the Government or the detainee when the CSRT 
made its findings.96 
The Court noted that such evidence might be ―critical to the detai-
nee‘s argument that he is not an enemy combatant‖ and should not be 
detained.97 
Consequently, the DTA did not serve as an effective substi-
tute for the writ of habeas corpus and Congress‘s attempt to strip the 
Court of habeas jurisdiction was invalid.98  Although the Court held 
that non-US citizens at Guantánamo had the right to petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, the Court explicitly stated that this was the ex-
tent of its holding and that it was not addressing what standards of 
law should govern review of the writ.99 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The striking note that resounds from Hamdi, Hamdan, and 
Boumediene is the insistence of the Judiciary that it, not the Execu-
tive or the Legislature, controls the power to set standards for due 
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process.100  Further, the Judiciary insisted on setting more stringent 
standards than the Executive was willing to set.101  Given the passions 
aroused during times of strife, it makes sense that the branch of gov-
ernment least affected by politics, and therefore likely to be less af-
fected by those passions, should set the standards protecting those ac-
cused of being foreign combatants. 
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